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Abstract
This Essay will begin by first assessing China’s economic stakes in Sudan. While economic
interests and priorities remain important, it does not sufficiently explain China’s shifting position
on Darfur. The Essay will then examine the critical factors shaping China’s expanding role in
Africa, more broadly, as an important context in understanding its evolving approach to Sudan
and the Darfur crisis. It will then delve more deeply into Beijing’s accommodating shifts on
Darfur, illustrating and mapping out the subtleties exhibited in China’s diplomatic and economic
engagements with the United States on the Darfur question.
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In spite of the widely acknowledged important economic
ties between China and Sudan, and notwithstanding Beijing's
strict adherence to the principles of sovereignty and non-inter-
ference, a more nuanced analysis of recent trends indicates
growing accommodation and subtle shifts in China's approach
to Sudan. Increasingly there is a perceived willingness from Beij-
ing to raise the issue of Darfur with senior Sudanese leaders, and
an emerging consensus with Washington that moving forward
with the "Annan Plan,"' United Nations ("U.N.") Secretary-Gen-
eral Kofi Annan's plan to send a joint U.N./African Union
("A.U.") peacekeeping force to Darfur, is critical to achieving
durable peace and stability in the conflict-stricken region.
China's Assistant Foreign Minister for African and Middle
East Affairs Zhai Jun and the special envoy for Darfur Liu
Guijin's timely visits to Sudan in April 2007 and February 2008
respectively, drew considerable press attention.2 These steps are
illustrative of Beijing's acute sensitivities and perceived need to
make a much higher diplomatic investment in managing the un-
* Chin-Hao Huang is a Research Associate at the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute ("SIPRI") in Stockholm, Sweden. Previously, he worked at the Free-
man Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies
("CSIS"), in Washington, DC, USA. This Essay draws from previous and ongoing re-
search conducted with Bates Gill (SIPRI) andJ. Stephen Morrison (CSIS). Specifically,
this piece draws from: Darfur Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007: Testimony on H.IL
180 Before the Subcomm. on Domestic and Int'l Monetary Policy, Trade, and Technology Comm.
on Financial Services U.S. H.R, 110th Cong. 1 (2007) (statement ofJ. Stephen Morrison,
Director, Africa Program Center for Strategic and International Studies); BATES GILL,
CHIN-HAO HUANG &J. STEPHEN MORRISON, CHINA'S EXPANDING ROLE IN AFRICA: IMPLICA-
TIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES, A REPORT OF THE CSIS DELEGATION TO CHINA ON CHINA-
AFRICA-U.S. RELATIONS Nov. 28-DEC. 1, 2006, at 6-13 (Ctr. for Strategic and Int'l Studies
2007); Bates Gill, Chin-Hao Huang & J. Stephen Morrison, Assessing China's Crowing
Influence in Africa, CHINA SECURITYJ., Summer 2007, at 3, 3-4.
1. The November 2006 Addis Agreement (also known as the "Annan Plan") called
for a three-step expansion of an African Union ("A.U.')/United Nations ("U.N.") hy-
brid force in Darfur and for Khartoum to commit to a ceasefire in the region. See Sudan
'Backs'Darfur Force Plan, BBC NEWS, Nov. 17, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/
6153208.stm.
2. See Helene Cooper, China Acts on Sudan After Hollywood Push, INIr'L HERALD
TRIB., Apr. 14, 2007, at 2; Mark Silva & Paul Salopek, U.S. Adds to Sudan Sanctions, CHI.
TRIB., May 30, 2007, at Cl; Jim Yardley, Chinese Envoy to Sudan Defends Policy on Darfur,
INr'L HERALD TRB., March 7, 2008.
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folding crisis in Darfur. At this early stage, however, there is no
guarantee for success with Beijing's approach. While Khartoum
has expressed its intention to comply with the Annan Plan, its
commitment to follow through is uncertain.' As such, Beijing
remains vulnerable to continued criticism from advocacy groups
concerned with Darfur for enabling Khartoum's intransigence.
Much more needs to be done, however, beyond the narrow
focus on Beijing's inadequate pressures toward Khartoum.
There needs to be a realistic understanding that the United
States, and much of the West, will continue to differ on respec-
tive assessments of the situation in Darfur and on the appropri-
ate measures to pursue in its resolution; the critical challenge is
to build on China's emerging openness to play a more construc-
tive role in Darfur.
To illuminate these arguments, this Essay will begin by first
assessing China's economic stakes in Sudan. While economic in-
terests and priorities remain important, it does not sufficiently
explain China's shifting position on Darfur. The Essay will then
examine the critical factors shaping China's expanding role in
Africa, more broadly, as an important context in understanding
its evolving approach to Sudan and the Darfur crisis. It will then
delve more deeply into Beijing's accommodating shifts on Dar-
fur, illustrating and mapping out the subtleties exhibited in
China's diplomatic and economic engagements with the United
States on the Darfur question.
I. CHINA 'S ECONOMIC STAKES IN SUDAN
The statistics are familiar to most observers following
China's economic interests in Sudan. Since the late 1990s,
China's expansive economic engagement in Sudan has been
concentrated in the energy sector, and Chinese oil companies
have made significant headway in constructing pipelines, refin-
eries, and securing exploration and production rights in seven
major blocks throughout Sudan.4 For one, the China National
Petroleum Corporation ("CNPC") has a forty percent equity
3. See Dafna Linzer, Sudan May Allow U.N. Force in Darfur, WASH. Posr, Dec. 27,
2006, at A08.
4. See Arms, Oil, and Darfur: The Evolution of Relations Between China and Sudan,
SMALL AsiS SURVEY, July 2007, at 2 [hereinafter Arms, Oil, and Darfur].
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stake in the northern oil fields of the Nile.5 In the other major
oil production area, the Dar field in the south, CNPC has a forty-
one percent stake.6 It also has a ninety-five percent share of a
separate block that mainly supplies Khartoum's refineries.' The
less-trumpeted fact, however, is that Sudan's contribution to
China's total energy needs is important but not strategic. In fact,
in the last five years, Chinese imports of Sudanese oil have been
declining.8 Sudan accounts for five to seven percent of China's
total oil imports, and less than one percent of China's total en-
ergy consumption.9 Sudan's producing oil fields are aging, and
its proven oil deposits modest by global standards. Production is
projected to decline in the next decade. There have been some
recent new discoveries, but not on a scale to sustain current pro-
duction (at approximately 500,000 barrels per day (bpd)) indefi-
nitely.' °
It is also important to recognize that there are other increas-
ingly active actors mixed in this complex picture. In both of Su-
dan's main oil-rich regions, oil companies from India, Malaysia,
and the United Arab Emirates also hold important partnerships
and stakes.'1 Japan has also fast-emerged as one of the largest
consumers of Sudanese oil, importing nearly half of CNPC's Su-
danese oil in 2006.12
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See Globaltimber.org.uk, China Crude Oil Imports, http://www.globaltimber.
org.uk/ChinaCrudeOilImports.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2008).
9. Oil accounts for roughly twenty-one percent of China's total energy supply, half
of which is imported. Sudan accounts for five to seven percent of China's oil imports,
which represents less than one percent of China's total energy consumption. See DANIEL
H. ROSEN & TREVOR HOUSER, CHINA ENERGY. A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED 19-22 (2007)
(describing extent of China's energy dependence on oil and gas); David Blair, Oil-Hun-
gry China Takes Sudan Under Its Wing, TELEGRAPH (London), Apr. 23, 2005, available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/News/2005/04/23/wsud23.xml
(estimating that China is dependant on Sudan for seven percent of all oil imports).
10. See, e.g., Opheera McDoom, Darfur Scares European Investors Off Sudan's Oil,
REUTERS, Aug. 3, 2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/email/idusmcd
133755.
11. See Arms, Oil, and Darfur, supra note 4, at 6.
12. See id. at 7.
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TABLE 1: SUDANESE OIL PRODUCTION AND
EXPORTS TO CHINA13
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Sudan oil production, in tons 11.5 12.6 16.1 18.7 20.7
CNPC's share (estimated), in tons 4.6 5.0 6.8 8.2 9.3
China's imports from Sudan, in tons 6.4 6.3 5.8 6.6 4.8
China's imports, share of Sudan's production, % 39 50 36 35 23
China imports, share of CNPC production, % 139 124 85 80 52
Source BP Statistical Review of World Energy, China Customs
In tons a year = 20,000 barrels a day
China is also Sudan's largest export market and biggest
source of foreign investment. 4 Aggregate sunken investment as
of late 2005 stood at an estimated US$15 billion, making China
the largest foreign investor in Sudan.1 5 According to Chinese
officials, bilateral trade amounted to US$2.9 billion in the first
eleven months of 2006.16 This is in a context in which total two-
way Chinese trade with Africa reached US$55.5 billion in 2006,
and is projected to reach US$100 billion by 2010.17 Sudan also
accounted for US$145 million, or nearly half of China's total
outward (non-financial institution) investment in Africa in
2004.18 Chinese officials estimate that of the 8,100 Chinese em-
ployed in Sudan (out of an official total of 45,000 Chinese em-
ployed throughout Africa), approximately 3,000 work for Chi-
nese companies implementing contracted projects in Darfur.19
13. Arthur Kroeber & G.A. Donovan, Sudan Oil: Where Does it go?, in Linda
Jakobson, The Burden of "Non-Interference", CHINA ECON. Q., Q2 14, 18 (2007).
14. See Arns, Oil, and Darfur, supra note 4, at 6-7.
15. SeeYtzhak Shichor, Sudan: China's Outpost in Africa, CHINA BRIEF, Nov. 4, 2005,
available at http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/2754.html.
16. See Opheera McDoom, China's Hu Visits Sudan, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Feb. 2,
2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/02/AR2007
020200325.html.
17. See China-Africa Trade Links, REUTERS, Feb. 3, 2007, available at http://
www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L01887144.htm.
18. See HARRY BROADMAN, AFRICA'S SILK ROAD: CHINA AND INDIA'S NEW ECONOMIC
FRONTIER 100 (2007); Jian-Ye Wang, What Drives China's Growing Role in Africa? 11 (Int'l
Monetary Fund, Working Paper WP/07/211, 2007), available at http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp0721 I.pdf.
19. Figures draw from interviews with Chinese officials. For further estimates, see
Barry V. Sautman, Friends and Interests: China's Distinctive Links With Africa (Ctr. on
China's Transnat'l Relation, Working Paper No. 12, 2005-2006), available at http://
www.cctr.ust.hk/articles/pdf/WorkingPaperl2.pdf; Shichor, supra note 15.
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II. THE CONTEXT OF CHINA 'S EXPANDING ROLE IN AFRICA
Beijing's proactive engagement with Africa, more broadly, is
grounded on several key factors that undergird the new Chinese
approach. First and foremost, China's quest to build a strategic
partnership with Africa fits squarely within Beijing's global for-
eign policy strategy and its vision of the evolving international
system. Africa is seen as integral to Beijing's strategic ambition
to advance a "new security concept" that can ensure China's
peaceful rise as a global power and strengthen relations with key
neighbors and regions."z More specifically, through its overarch-
ing global approach, the leadership in Beijing seeks to sustain
China's internal development and political stability at home, le-
gitimize within the international community the historic benefits
of China's rise, and achieve its longer-term goal of a more multi-
polar international system where it will have a greater and more
influential voice.
As such, China's hard national interests and strategic needs
bind it increasingly to the continent. In earlier decades, expres-
sions of political solidarity and altruism dominated Chinese dis-
cussions of Africa. These are still relevant today but take a back
seat to hard national interests."z China increasingly turns to
such African countries as Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, and
Sudan for resources to fuel China's development goals, for mar-
kets to sustain its growing economy, and for political alliances to
support its aspirations to a peaceful rise on the global stage.22
The historical amity and linkages between China and Africa
continue to play as important factors. The close connection be-
tween Beijing and Khartoum is part and parcel of China's long-
standing history of friendly, respectful, and helpful political link-
ages with Africa, which appears to provide a durable foundation
20. See David M. Finkelstein, China's "New Concept of Security", in THE PEOPLE'S LIB-
ERATION ARMY AND CHINA IN TRANSITION 197, 197-210 (Stephen J. Flanagan & Michael
E. Marti eds., Ctr. for the Study of Chinese Mil. Affairs 2003) (describing China's "New
Concept of Security" as an indication that China was leaning forward in international
community to offer alternative for how nations should pursue national security in the
post-Cold War order).
21. See generally Jean-Christophe Servant, China's Trade Safari in Africa, LE MONDE
DIPLOMATIQUE (Fr.), May 2005, available at http://mondediplo.com/2005/05/
1 lchinafrica (describing China's motivations in becoming more economically and po-
litically active in Africa).
22. See Michael Sheridan, China Builds African Empire, TIMES (London), Nov. 18,
2007, at 1 (discussing China's growing economic relationship with African nations).
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for a future strategic partnership. The Chinese leadership is
often heard touting the fact that over the past fifty years, Beijing
has established a legacy of political solidarity and development
assistance in partnership with Africa, at a time when China was
internationally isolated, impoverished, and beset by major inter-
nal challenges.23 Reflecting principles dating to the Bandung
Conference of developing nations in 1955, Beijing staunchly
supports the inviolability of African state sovereignty, non-inter-
ference in internal affairs, and the need for postcolonial nations
to stand up to external "bullying" and "hegemonism. "24 Chinese
leaders also recognize that its relationship with Africa has earned
China momentous diplomatic dividends. Beijing has not forgot-
ten that Africa's support in the early-1970s was vital to Beijing
gaining its seat in the United Nations. 25 Today, Beijing assidu-
ously courts those remaining African countries that continue for-
mally to recognize Taiwan in an effort to further isolate Taiwan
in the international community.
26
Beijing's comparative advantage vis-A-vis the West derives
from the fact that Chinese leaders and strategists believe China's
historical experience and development model resonate power-
fully with African counterparts. China emerged from colonial
encroachment, internal chaos, and economic destitution to
achieve spectacular economic growth and infrastructure devel-
opment. In the past two decades, its achievements have lifted
over 200 million Chinese citizens out of poverty.2 7 In the
23. See China's Role in Darfur Positive, CHINADAILY.COM.CN, Feb. 18, 2008, http://
www.chinadaily.com.cn/olympics/2008-02/18/content_6461925.htm.
24. The Bandung Conference was instrumental in the creation of the Non-Aligned
Movement, and addressed common problems of colonialism, economic development,
and the maintenance of peace in the third world. See No-Hyoung Park, The Third World
as an International Legal System, 7 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 37, 4546 (1987).
25. See ELLING N. TJONNELANT ET AL., CHR. MICHELSEN INST., CHINA IN AFRICA: IM-
PLICATIONS FOR NORWEGIAN FOREIGN AND DEVELOPMENT POLICIES 49 (2006) (noting that
China often points out that it restored its Security Council seat in 1971 with the affirma-
tive votes of twenty-six African countries, more than one third of the total).
26. See, e.g., Analysts Debate: Should U.S. Let China Take Taiwan By Force?, 9 SPACE &
MISSILE DEF. REP. No. 6, Feb. 11, 2008 (quotingJohn Tkacik, senior research fellow in
Asian Studies Center of the Heritage Foundation, as saying that China is attempting to
"isolate Taiwan and strangle it").
27. See AsIAN DEV. BANK, CHALLENGES TO REDUCING POVERTY IN THE PEOPLE'S RE-
PUBLIC OF CHINA (2007), available at http://www.adb.org/PRF/knowledge-products/
PRC-4222-reducing-poverty.pdf; Sukant Chandan, Africa United Against E. U. Arrogance,
HERALD (Harare), Dec. 18, 2007 (noting that China has won U.N. awards for its poverty
alleviation).
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meantime, China can claim that it has achieved solid political
stability and increasing international clout. Such a national nar-
rative, it is asserted, has a powerful resonance in Africa.
In Beijing's perspective, Africans and Chinese thus find
common ground in the view that the West's historical exper-
iences in achieving development are too remote from the Afri-
can experience, offer fewer transferable lessons, and that the
Western economic model has generated few dramatic success
stories in Africa. In a stark contrast to the West's moralizing,
bureaucratic, and conditional development approaches, Beijing
unabashedly claims to provide development aid with little to "no
political strings attached" and with greater emphasis on political
stability and economic development.28
Chinese strategists further maintain that Africa is on the
verge of a developmental take-off-another idea that is well-re-
ceived in the continent-creating an opportune moment for a
more expansive Chinese role. According to this view, Africa has
realized a period of relative stability and calm as compared to
the dark days of the 1990s when protracted conflicts raged in
more than a dozen countries. 29 Chinese interlocutors recognize
that while pockets of conflict still persist and require close inter-
national engagement in such areas as Sudan, Somalia, the Dem-
ocratic Republic of Congo, and Ivory Cost, the broader Chinese
view is that Africa, by and large, has emerged into a continent of
relative peace and stability, poised to make major developmental
gains. As such, Beijing is keen to get in on the ground floor and
28. See Chandan, supra note 27 (stating that Africans favor relations with China in
comparison to the West because "China will not criminalise you, starve your country
with sanctions and possibly blitz and occupy your country, whereas the West might");
Leander Schaerlaeckens, China-Africa Bond Worries U.S., E.U., WASH. TIMES, Feb. 14,
2008, at A17 (recognizing that China has invested in areas such as infrastructure and
roads in Africa, while the European Union ("E.U.") and United States have not); Hugh
Williamson, African Affront as the "Rich Club" Leaves Aid Pledges Unmet, FIN. TIMES
(London), Oct. 15, 2007, at 9 ("China is often quicker to act and does not apply govern-
ance or human rights standards common in the West when offering loans or develop-
ment aid.").
29. See, e.g., Tom Porteous, Resolving African Conflicts, WAR IN AFRICA, Oct. 2004,
http://www.crimesofwar.org/africa-mag/afr_01_porteos.html ("[B]y the end of the
1990s, any political and even economic progress since the end of the Cold War had
been overshadowed by a series of old and new wars that now engulged many parts of
the continent and were tipping whole regions into instability and poverty."). For an in-
depth study of conflicts in Africa over the past fifty eight years, see CSP CENTRE FOR
SYSTEMIC PEACE, CONFLICT TRENDS IN AFRICA, 1946-2004 (2006), available at http://
www.crimesofwar.org/africa-mag/afr-01-porteos.html.
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be an integral part of Africa's impending political and economic
transformation.
China's policymakers are also confident that a state-centric
approach to Africa will build strategically on Beijing's core ad-
vantages and align with the stated preferences of African coun-
tries. For Beijing, such an approach plays to its strengths. Its
Africa policy is not complicated by private domestic constituen-
cies and interest groups, allowing for quicker and more decisive
action. China's largest economic and business activities in Africa
are dominated by state-owned and/or state-influenced compa-
nies, giving official Beijing another leg up in political and eco-
nomic competition in Africa. China lacks well-developed, inde-
pendent business and civil society sectors, which for now leaves
the full lead responsibility for carrying forward its vision in the
hands of state leaders and official diplomats.
Beijing has an interest to engage third parties on Africa on
such issues of common concern as Darfur, but it will proceed
cautiously, slowly, and with serious reservations. Chinese senior
officials have indicated their openness to collaboration with the
United States, and Chinese scholars and experts on Africa fur-
ther acknowledge the value of drawing on U.S. and other West-
ern expertise and knowledge of Africa, including engagement
with African civil society, business partners, and regional organi-
zations.30
However, China remains wary of and highly sensitive to U.S.
discussion of its approach in Africa, reflecting Beijing's continu-
ing concern with perceived U.S. hegemony and the related fear
that Washington's long-term intention is to contain China's am-
bitions to become a global power and competitor. Such think-
ing is rooted in proud Chinese nationalism that bridles at over-
reaching American power, influence, and sermonizing in Africa
and elsewhere around the world. The defeat of the China Na-
tional Offshore Oil Company's ("CNOOC") bid for the U.S.-
owned energy firm UNOCAL in 2005 is a relevant case in
30. In a U.N. briefing in September 2007, Chinese Ambassador Liu Guijin noted
China's cooperation with the E.U. and stated that China "wished to collaborate with any
other country that sought to assist in the development of Africa." See Briefing, Office of
the Special Advisor on Africa & Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China,
China-Africa Relations (Sept. 20, 2007), available at http://www.un.org/africa/osaa/
press/China%20Africa%2OBriefing%2OSeptember%202007.pdf.
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point.3 1 Chinese analysts have asserted that this was further indi-
cation of the U.S. determination to prevent the rise of a Chinese
global energy firm and that the outcome directly prompted Chi-
nese authorities to intensify its push for a strategic partnership in
Sudan and other energy-rich regions of Africa.32
III. CHINA'S EVOLVING APPROACH TO THE DARFUR CRISIS
The question of responding to humanitarian crises such as
Darfur has become one of the most formidable challenges for
Beijing in translating its vision of a strategic partnership with Af-
rica into a sustainable reality. It is facing persistent pressures to
support humanitarian interventions, and Beijing has begun to
realize that adhering to a formal policy of non-interference and
putting it into consistent practice will be difficult.
U.S. critics often focus narrowly on China's pursuit of en-
ergy as the best explanatory lens through which to understand
China's policies in Sudan. Some American voices argue that the
Chinese engagement in Africa is predominantly a form of crude
mercantilism and political interventionism that directly threat-
ens U.S. interests and hence calls for confrontation, condemna-
tion, and containment. 33
An array of human rights advocacy groups and non-govern-
mental organizations, for example, place intense pressure on the
U.S. government to take decisive, punitive measures in response
to the situation in Darfur, including calls for forced humanita-
rian intervention and branding the 2008 Beijing Olympics as the
"Genocide Olympics."34
In fact, China's expansive engagement in Sudan (and in Af-
31. In 2005, the U.S. Congress effectively blocked state-owned China National Off-
shore Oil Company ("CNOOC") from acquiring U.S. oil producer UNOCAL by adopt-
ing legislation that would have required a lengthy review process. CNOOC abandoned
the transaction on August 2, 2005. See generally James A. Dorn, U.S.-China Relations in the
Wake of CNOOC, POL'Y ANALYsis, Nov. 2, 2005, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/
pas/pa553.pdf.
32. For example, in response to U.S. Congressional efforts to block the CNOOC
transaction, the Chinese foreign ministry stated: "We demand that the U.S. Congress
correct its mistaken ways of politicizing economic and trade issues, and stop interfering
in the normal commercial exchanges." Matt Pottinger et al., CNOOC Drops Offer for
UNOCAL, Exposing U.S.-Chinese Tensions, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2005, at A8.
33. See, e.g., Schaerlaeckens, supra note 28.
34. See, e.g., Editorial, China and Darfur-The Genocide Olympics?, WASH. POST, Dec.
14, 2006, at A30.
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rica on the whole) is a complex new reality which we only par-
tially grasp: fast moving, multidimensional, and long-range in its
various impacts. The Darfur issue, in particular, is a case in
point where Chinese policy has seen subtle, incremental shifts.
China faces increasing debates and complexities in its policy
choices.35 Progressives in the Chinese policy-making elite argue
that Sudan's oil assets are not worth pursuing in the long run,
and have suggested scaling back relations with Khartoum in an
attempt to burnish China's image and international reputation.
Inversely, there is a tendency among Chinese conservatives to
argue that the United States and other Western countries are
merely trying to force China out of Sudan to get to its oil.36 The
Chinese critics are also quick to point out that the United
States-by dealing closely with such countries as Equatorial
Guinea 3 7-is just as likely to engage in an uncritical embrace of
autocratic, corrupt, and unstable regimes.
Chinese views on Darfur are also increasingly reflective of
African opinion. A majority of the African states are frustrated
with Khartoum's lack of sincerity to follow through with its in-
ternational commitments; as a result, the African Union has re-
fused to allow Sudan to take on the role of the organization's
presidency for two consecutive years. Many leaders in sub-
Saharan African states further find Khartoum's actions in Darfur
offensive on human rights, religious and racial grounds.3 ' Khar-
toum's full compliance to accept the Annan Plan is questiona-
ble, and the inability of the international community to bring
greater stability to Sudan means in practice that African Union
peacekeeping forces, including troops from South Africa,
Rwanda and Nigeria, remain under grave strain, cannot be relia-
bly sustained and for these reasons are placed at considerable
35. See generally The Escalating Crisis In Darfur: Are There Prospects For Peace?: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 4-17 (Feb. 8, 2007) (written statement
of J. Stephen Morrison and Bates Gill, CSIS), available at http://foreignaffairs.
house.gov/110/33109.pdf.
36. See Simon Robinson, Time Running Out, TIME.COM, Sept. 10, 2006, http://www.
time.com/magazine/article/0,9171,901060918-1533376,00.html.
37. See, e.g., Justin Blum, U.S. Oil Firms Entwined in Equatorial Guinea Deals, WASH.
POST, Sept. 7, 2004, at E01 (describing relationship between U.S. oil companies and the
corrupt government of Equatorial Guinea).
38. See Stephanie McCrummen, Struggling Chadians Dream of a Better Life-in China,
WASH. PosT, Oct. 6, 2007, at A17 (noting that African leaders are troubled by China's
role in enabling problematic governments such as Sudan's).
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risk. China, for its part, is vulnerable to being called to account
within Africa for enabling Khartoum's intransigence and imped-
ing the A.U.'s efforts.
As a result, a gradual shift in Chinese thinking is exhibited
in several concrete actions taken by Beijing to exert additional
pressure on Khartoum. The Chinese ambassador to the United
Nations, Wang Guangya, became very active and was widely
credited in gaining Sudanese acceptance for the Annan Plan in
November 2006."0
In February 2007, there were unrealistically high hopes that
President Hu might forcefully press President Bashir to accept
the hybrid force. In public, China continued to emphasize its
economic ties with Sudan and made new pledges of support, in-
cluding aid in building a presidential palace."a Understandably,
these announcements drew international opprobrium.
In private, Hu reportedly intervened personally to press
President Bashir to stick to his commitments. Prior to leaving
Sudan, President Hu delivered a rare public statement that out-
lined "four principles" as the basis for an international approach
to Darfur." The first, not unexpectedly, reaffirmed the princi-
ple of non-interference.4 2 But the fourth principle seems to con-
tradict the first, saying: "it is imperative to improve the situation
in Darfur and living conditions of local people."43 That is about
as close as a Chinese leader has come publicly to supporting the
emerging notion in the United Nations and the broader interna-
tional community that governments have a "responsibility to pro-
tect" their citizens from harm.
Furthermore, in March 2007, the National Development
and Reform Commission, China's main economic planning
agency, released a public document in conjunction with the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce, not-
ing that Sudan had been removed from the latest list of coun-
39. See Edward Cody, China Given Credit for Darfur Role, WASH. PosT, Jan. 13, 2007,
at A13 (noting that Wang Guangya was "critical" to securing Sudan's participation in
placing A.U. peacekeeping forces in Darfur).
40. See Save Darfur Coal., China and Sudan Fact Sheet, http://www.savedarfur.
org/newsroom/policypapers/chinaand sudan factsheet (last visited Feb. 15, 2008).
41. See Hu Puts Forward Principle on Darfur Issue, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (BEIJING),
Feb. 5, 2007, available at http://chinadaily.com.cn/world/2007-02/05/con-
tent_801432.htm.
42. See id.
43. See id.
83720081
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tries with preferred trade status.4 4 According to the announce-
ment, Beijing will no longer provide financial incentives to Chi-
nese companies to invest in Sudan.45 This latest move appears to
be a signal of Chinese disaffection with President Bashir's unwill-
ingness to comply with his commitments to implement the An-
nan Plan.
The announcement was welcomed by the U.S. State Depart-
ment and came shortly before Chinese Assistant Minister Zhai
Jun arrived in Washington to meet with U.S. Assistant Secretary
of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer for the second round
of U.S.-China subdialogue on Africa in March 2007.46 The inau-
gural dialogue was formally launched in November 2005 under
the auspices of the U.S.-China Senior Dialogue process initiated
by former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick.4 7 While the
first bilateral meeting on Africa focused largely on formalities,
the second subdialogue in early March 2007 focused on the spe-
cific issues of debt sustainability, peacekeeping operations, Chi-
nese companies' reputational risks in Africa, and transparency in
the extractive industries. On Sudan, the Chinese side reportedly
acknowledged the need for the international community to step
up efforts and become more active in leveraging their respective
influences on Darfur.
In April 2007, Assistant Minister Zhai Jun visited Sudan to
get a fuller understanding of the tense political relations be-
44. See Richard McGregor, Iran, Sudan, Nigeria, Off China Incentive List, FIN. TIMES
(London), Mar. 2, 2007, at 6.
45. See id.
46. See Ruth A. Davis, U.S. Dep't of State, U.S.-Africa Policy, Address at East China
Normal University (Sept. 11, 2007), available at http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/
93172.htm (highlighting China's favorable response to Assistant Secretary Frazer's sug-
gestion at the second subdialogue that China provide engineers to support peacekeep-
ing operations in Darfur).
47. At the official level, the United States and China in 2005 began to take some
steps to think through their increasingly complex and interdependent relationship in a
more constructive and strategic way. This effort, known at the "senior leaders' dia-
logue," was led on the U.S. side by then-Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, who
called for China to join the United States in becoming a "responsible stakeholder" in
the international system. Both sides agreed to hold bilateral subdialogues on key re-
gional issues. The door was thus opened in 'Washington to begin thinking more seri-
ously about an effective U.S. strategy for engaging China on Africa. See Press Release,
U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, The U.S.-China Senior Dialogue: Building
A Strong Framework for Mutual Trust (June 22, 2007), available at http://www.state.
gov/r/pa/scp/87166.htm.
U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS AMD DARFUR
tween Darfur and government leaders in Khartoum.48 Zhai was
also the first senior Chinese official to visit the internally dis-
placed persons ("IDP") camps and to meet with a wide range of
faction and military leaders as well as local refugees in Darfur.49
The visit has allowed Beijing officials to engage in a dialogue
with the concerned parties and to get a clearer assessment of the
current realities of the humanitarian situation in Darfur.
Shortly after Zhai's visit, Beijing announced the appoint-
ment of Ambassador Liu Guijin as the special envoy to Africa.5"
Liu, a seasoned diplomat, has taken on the Darfur issue as a top
priority. Liu visited Sudan at least twice immediately after hisap-
pointment in 2007 and conducted diplomatic consultations with
concerned parties in Addis Ababa, Brussels, Paris and Pretoria to
help move the agenda forward in Darfur.5" Following Khar-
toum's acceptance of an expanded peacekeeping force in Dar-
fur in June 2007, Liu reportedly stated that Beijing had been
using "very direct language" as well as its own wisdom to per-
suade Khartoum to accept the A.U./U.N. hybrid force.5 2
At the fourth round of the U.S.-China Senior Dialogue held
from June 20 to 21, 2007, Deputy Secretary of StateJohn Negro-
ponte and Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo covered a range of
key bilateral and global issues, including Darfur.53 A couple of
constructive developments resulted from this meeting. First, the
State Department's official statement at the end of the dialogue
acknowledged the Chinese characterization of Darfur as a "hu-
manitarian crisis" (as opposed to genocide).5" Second, the two
sides agreed that the various subdialogues, including on Africa,
should continue in order to deepen mutual understanding and
enhance collaboration in areas of common concern.55
In September 2007, Beijing reportedly committed a US$200
million loan to Sudan to help finance the bulk of a compensa-
48. See generally Helene Cooper, Darfur Collides with Olympics, and China Yields, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 13, 2007, at Al.
49. See id.
50. See Alec Russell & William Wallis, China Puts Private Pressure on Sudan, FIN.
TIMES (London), June 19, 2007, at 2.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See Media Note, U.S. Dep't of State, Conclusion of the Fourth US.-China Senior
Dialogue (June 21, 2007), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/jun/86997.htm.
54. See id.
55. See id.
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tion payment Khartoum pledged to make to Darfur shortly
before the talks in Libya between rebel factions and Khartoum
in October 2007.6 Beijing has a tendency to provide loans for
trade and infrastructure projects; this development marks an im-
portant departure in its traditional foreign assistance practices.
57
In November 2007, China dispatched an advanced party of
135 engineers to Darfur, as part of a contingency of 315 engi-
neers in support of the hybrid peacekeeping force .5  The ardu-
ous negotiations that took place behind the scenes for this ar-
rangement shed light on the perceived growing frustration by
Chinese policymakers with Sudanese officials. The deployment
was delayed for more than a month, with Beijing insisting that a
small number of force protection unit military personnel be in-
cluded to help monitor peacekeeping activities in the region as
well as to protect Chinese peacekeepers on the ground. 59 The
recent killings of A.U. peacekeepers in late September 2007
alarmed Beijing.6° Khartoum, however, refused this request.
Following intense weeks of negotiation, armed Chinese combat-
ant forces were not deployed, and the Sudanese agreed to let
Chinese peacekeepers into Darfur.6 1 This friction has led Chi-
nese negotiators to acknowledge in private that relations be-
tween China and Sudan are fraught with growing mistrust.
With Chinese engineers physically on the ground, they are
also becoming targets of criticism by local rebel factions in Dar-
fur.62 The Justice and Equality Movement ('JEM") has indicated
their strong opposition to the presence of Chinese
56. See BarneyJopson, Beijing to Back Darfur Payment, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 4,
2007, at 5.
57. See id.
58. See China Opposes Public Threat to Security of Chinese Peacekeepers in Darfur, CHINA
VIEW, Nov. 28, 2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-11/28/content_7159
769.htm.
59. Initially, the Chinese peacekeepers were scheduled to arrive in Darfur in Octo-
ber. See Edward Cody, In China, a Display of Resolve on Darfur, WAsH. POST, Sept. 16, 2007,
at A14.
60. See Darfur Rebels Attack Base, Kill 10 Peacekeepers, CNN.coM, Sept. 30, 2007, http:/
/edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/africa/09/30/darfur.peacekeepers/index.html.
61. See Sara Hassan, Chinese Peacekeepers Arrive in Darfur, GLOBAL INSIGHT, Nov. 26,
2007 (noting that approximately 130 Chinese peacekeepers arrived in South Darfur in
late November, 2007).
62. See Darfur Rebels Spurn Chinese Force, BBC NEWS, Nov. 24, 2007, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/africa/7111206.stm.
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peacekeepers.6 3 It has also attacked Chinese-managed oil facili-
ties and threatened to kidnap Chinese civilians and workers to
alert Beijing that it should refrain from intervening and main-
taining close ties with Khartoum.64 As a result, the Chinese
peacekeeping support unit for the hybrid force deployed in Ny-
ala (southern Darfur) has faced great difficulties in conducting
its field operations.
Chinese officials are thus increasingly concerned with the
safety of its nationals in Sudan; Beijing now appears more in
tune to the deteriorating situation on the ground and will be
prepared to take a more accommodating approach regarding
"non-interference" when its interests are at stake.
Acknowledging the need to address growing criticisms of
Beijing's Darfur policy, Ambassador Liu Guijin has pursued a
more active diplomatic outreach in recent months. In Decem-
ber 2007, Liu participated in a track-two dialogue on China-Af-
rica-U.S. relations in Washington, DC with his U.S. counterpart
Andrew Natsios and the A.U. Director for Peace and Security
Sam Ibok. Liu accepted the need for greater alignment of its
policies toward Darfur with the West, and his counterparts pub-
licly acknowledged Beijing's constructive efforts in the lead up to
the deployment of the first batch of peacekeepers to support the
Annan Plan.65
Subsequently, in late February 2008, prior to visiting Khar-
toum, Liu made a stopover in London and delivered a high-pro-
file public speech at an academic conference. Liu announced
that Beijing has been "forced" to take a more open and direct
approach on the situation in Darfur.6 6 In Khartoum, Liu report-
edly pressed the Sudanese Foreign Minister Deng Alor that pa-
tience is thin with Sudan on Darfur and urged the regime to
amend its behavior so as to avoid sanctions. 67 Such a stern warn-
63. See id.
64. See generally Threats to Darfur Peacekeepers From Sudanese Rebels Will Not be Tolerated,
China Warns, INT'L HERALD TRiB., Nov. 28, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/
2007/11/28/asia/AS-GEN-China-Darfur.php.
65. For more information see the Report of the second round of the "U.S.-China
Forum on Africa" hosted by CSIS and organized in partnership with SIPRI and the
China Institute for International Studies ("CIIS") (forthcoming 2008).
66. For transcript of Ambassador Liu Guijin's speech at the Chatham House, see
http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/events/view/-/id/752/.
67. See China Speaks Out on Darfur Crisis, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Feb. 25, 2008, at
2008]
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ing reflects the growing impatience in the Security Council. The
possibility of renewed calls to impose sanctions on Sudan may
become more likely following an extensive on-the-ground inter-
national inspection visit to the region in April to assess and gain
first-hand assessment of the current difficulties behind the full
implementation of the hybrid force.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD
It appears that there is now greater consensus on hot spots
in Africa such as Darfur, in part because there is congruence in
Beijing's evolving approach and Washington's outlook. It would
be wishful thinking that China will do what needs to be done in
Sudan solely because it wishes to please the international com-
munity. It will not overtly undermine its policy of "non-interfer-
ence" and respect for sovereignty, even with Sudan. But, it will
begin to amend its approaches as it recognizes that continued
alignment with a staunch defense of Khartoum could further
damage its international reputation.
As such, continuing to see China's economic, political, or
diplomatic activities there as a zero-sum game would be counter-
productive. The emerging trend is an encouraging sign in this
early debate; the challenge will be for Washington to make a
stronger commitment to sustain this momentum at a high diplo-
matic level to understand the subtleties behind China's evolving
perspective, continue to test Beijing's intentions systematically,
and enlarge its commitments to play a more constructive role in
Darfur.
